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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a model of a counter-piracy operation, where a task force has 
one operational asset (a destroyer) and one reconnaissance asset (an unmanned aerial 
vehicle) to reduce piracy in a large region.  The region is divided into small areas, and 
each day the pirates operate in one area to hijack commercial vessels to collect ransoms.  
The information is asymmetric to the two players.  The pirates know which area is more 
profitable, but the task force does not.  The task force can use the operational asset to 
prevent piracy, and the reconnaissance asset to collect information on the profitability of 
each area.  The pirates want to maximize their income over a thirty-day period, while the 
task force wants to minimize it.  The numerical experiments quantify the value of the 
operational asset and the reconnaissance asset in this counter-piracy operation. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Optimizing intelligence collection with limited resources is a common problem 
for operational commanders.  The dilemma facing operational commanders is how to 
reconcile the conflict between maximum intelligence collection and maximum 
operational effects.  This thesis presents a counter-piracy model with two scenarios as an 
example of the conflict between the effects of operational and reconnaissance assets.    
The scenarios represent small scale operations with a Task Force that has one 
Destroyer and one Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to prevent a group of Pirates from 
hijacking commercial vessels.  The region where the Pirates operate is broken into three 
areas.  The Destroyer can prevent the Pirates from operating in one area each day, while 
the UAV collects information about one area each day.  The reward the Pirates receive 
for hijacking a vessel in an area varies according to merchant traffic density and 
environmental conditions.  The Pirates are familiar with the local environment and know 
the reward distribution for operating in each area, while the Task Force does not.  The 
Task Force employs the Destroyer to deter hijackings and can learn the reward 
distributions to maximize the effects of the Destroyer.   
The model compares the reward the Pirates receive over a thirty-day period and 
the time required for the Task Force to learn the true state of nature in four cases.  The 
cases are (1) when the Task Force has one Destroyer that cannot collect intelligence, (2) 
when the Destroyer can collect intelligence, (3) when a UAV that can collect intelligence 
is added, and (4) when the Task Force knows the true state of nature.  The scenarios are 
further divided into three simulations with different variances in the Pirate’s reward. 
 The numerical experiments show the Pirate’s reward decreasing significantly as 
the amount of reconnaissance is increased through each case.  The results also show 
increased effects of reconnaissance when variance in Pirate reward increases.  The model 
and the numerical experiments provide insight into tasking methodologies for 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND ON PIRACY AND COUNTER PIRACY OPERATIONS 
1. Overview on Piracy 
 Piracy occurs in nearly every maritime realm and has been a threat to legal 
commerce for thousands of years.  Bertrand Russell cites the early reasons for piracy in 
the Mediterranean in his History of Western Philosophy. 
Weapons, until about 1000 B.C., were made of bronze, and nations which 
did not have the necessary metals on their own territory were obliged to 
obtain them by trade or piracy.  Piracy was a temporary expedient, and 
where social and political conditions were fairly stable, commerce was 
found to be more profitable. (Russell, 1972) 
Outside the Mediterranean, several regions are famous for piracy.  Particularly the 
Caribbean in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Barbary Pirates of the same era, the straits 
of Malacca from 14th century to present, and most recently in the news is piracy off the 
coast of Somalia.  The common thread is that piracy was more profitable than legitimate 
commerce for a variety of reasons including a lack of natural resources, abundance of 
valuable trade routes, easy access to weapons, and a lack of governments to provide 
maritime security.  Modern piracy takes many forms, such as robbery of vessels at sea or 
at anchor, the hijacking of vessels at sea, and kidnap for ransom attacks (Raymond, 
2009). 
Combating piracy requires several aspects to decrease the allure of piracy.  Peter 
Leeson, a noted economist at George Mason and author of The Invisible Hook: The 
Hidden Economics of Pirates, was quoted in the New York Times blog stating, “We have 
to recognize that pirates are rational economic actors and that piracy is an occupational 
choice. If we think of them as irrational, or as pursuing other ends, we’re liable to come 
up with solutions to the pirate problem that are ineffective.” (Hagen, 2009) 
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2. Operations to Suppress Piracy 
Naval counter-piracy operations take many forms including escort operations 
through high risk sea lanes, naval presence operations, and direct assault against pirate 
land bases.  The success or failure of these operations depend on the environment, type of 
pirates, nature of commercial targets, and resources available to the counter-piracy forces.   
The most famous counter-piracy example in U.S. history is the attack on the 
Barbary Pirates in the early 19th century.  A land force of Americans and Arabs on the 
outskirts of Tripoli, produced a peace treaty with sponsors of regional pirates, signed on 
June 5, 1805.  Although this treaty included tribute of $60,000, it was attributed to a 
change in philosophy of European governments on their policy of tribute.  The era of 
terror and crime on the high seas in North Africa was over (Turner, 2003). 
Efforts in the Straits of Malacca, a long time hot spot for piracy, is another 
example of counter-piracy operations conducted by regional navies to establish legal 
procedures.  In 1992, the International Maritime Bureau created the Piracy Reporting 
Center in Kuala Lumpur.  The reporting center brought attention to the regional problem 
and combined with the threat of terrorism to require action from regional partners.  
International pressures from the U.S. and Japan particularly helped encourage Malaysia 
and Indonesia to work with the Singapore Navy in coordinated patrols of the region.  
Increased cooperation in the region includes the agreement for the Information Sharing 
Center in Singapore for fourteen nations.  Combined with increased regional stability in 
the Aceh Province of Indonesia piracy was reduced significantly after 2004 (Raymond, 
2009).   These efforts highlight the importance in combined efforts to make piracy 
physically difficult while removing the underlying cause by facilitating more profitable 
enterprises in the region. 
The Gulf of Aden represents one aspect of Somali piracy with unique issues.  The 
Gulf of Aden is a highly trafficked region with several unstable states around it, 
particularly Yemen and Somalia.  The high density of merchant traffic in the constrained 
space make easy targets for pirates.  A recent proliferation of piracy in the region in 2008 
brought forth significant international cooperation in the form of naval task forces from 
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several countries including Russia, India, and China, as well as members of the Coalition 
Naval Forces in the U.S. Central Command area of operations.  The U.S. stood up TASK 
FORCE 151 to coordinate the patrols in the region.  The concentration of naval assets in 
the constrained area brought several successes in the form of foiled attacks.  During the 
summer and fall of 2008, two dozen attacks were repelled by U.S. FIFTH Fleet warships 
(Hassan & Gutterman, 2008).  Piracy still occurs in the region, and as of the spring of 
2009, 250 mariners and dozens of ships were being held for ransom.  The International 
Maritime Organization sponsored a meeting in January of 2009 to coordinate efforts of 
regional nations to develop a coherent approach.  The strategy is reflected in the Djibouti 
Code of Conduct.  The Djibouti Code focuses on building the diplomatic, legal, and 
military capabilities of the regional nations including Somalia to be able to counter all 
aspects of piracy.    
Despite the successful examples of counter-piracy operations, future and ongoing 
crises will be constrained by resources.  Military and diplomatic leaders must 
compromise on the amount of support they can offer.  The demand will continually exist 
for a combined set of metrics legally, militarily, economically, and diplomatically to 
prevent piracy.   
3.  Challenges and Threats Resulting from Piracy in Somalia 
The problem with piracy in the Gulf of Aden is significantly different than the 
problem in the Somali Basin.  The vast expanse of water, combined with the large 
number of fishing villages on the Somali east coast, prevent effective saturation by naval 
forces.  Large transit distances prevent escort operations.  The co-location of pirate’s 
bases of operations with fishing villages inhibits military strikes on pirate bases.  The 
instability of the Somali government and the fractured tribal structure of the fishing 
villages further complicate the problem and prevent diplomatic or economic solutions.  
U.S. Agency for International Development, through their famine early warning network, 
notes Somalia’s increased reliance on foreign foods arriving in Somali ports and the 
associated decrease in regional stability.  The threat of piracy further increases 
commodity prices, decreases income in commercial trade, and delays shipments 
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throughout the region (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2009).  The result is 
a cycle that increases the incentive for Somali’s to turn to piracy and decreases legitimate 
commercial incentives.  The threat of famine increases risk of piracy during relief 
operations. When international government organizations and nongovernment 
organizations attempt to send relief supplies, pirates can hijack supplies and increase their 
profits and local prestige. 
4. Current U.S. Policy and Limitations 
 While the U.S. is pursuing a combined policy that combines State and Defense 
Department resources in accordance with the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the challenges of 
Somalia are daunting.  The interagency response, referred to as a Maritime Operational 
Threat Response (MOTR) plan works with the International Maritime Bureau and 
regional partners to encourage conditions that discourage piracy in the region (Kraska & 
Wilson, 2009).  However, the training of the Somali Coast Guard is focused on the more 
lucrative area of the Gulf of Aden instead of the larger region of the Somali basin.   
Recent initiative, such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, will improve local conditions 
and encourage lawful behavior, but change will take time.  The lack of infrastructure, 
complex tribal organizations, and vast length of the Somali east coast guarantee progress 
will move slowly.  This leads to the question of how much we can accomplish with a 
small military force operating in a large region where pirates operate. 
5. Joint and Navy Doctrine to Implement Policy 
 The implementation of the national policy requires guidance for operational 
employment.  Joint publications provide the guidance required to develop operational 
measures of effectiveness and intelligence requirements.  Joint publications also include 
guidance for measures of performance.  Tactical guidance requires documents specific to 
individual platforms.  Operational guidance is contained within Service and Combatant 
Commander’s guidance.  These are typically derived from the overriding publications 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
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 Doctrine related to the operational employment of reconnaissance in support of a 
task force is contained in Joint Publication 2.01.3 Joint Tactics Techniques and 
Procedures for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.   
The primary purpose of reconnaissance is to gain information to facilitate 
the JIPB [Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace] support to the 
operational level is concerned with analyzing the operational area, 
facilitating the flow of friendly forces in a timely manner, sustaining those 
forces, and then integrating tactical capabilities at the decisive time and 
place. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000)   
This document is the primary source for understanding the flow of information during 
operational planning and provides guidance on the development of intelligence 
requirements. 
 Joint Operational Planning Joint Publication 5.0 is the primary document for 
operational planners to assist in understanding the operational environment and 
developing operational effects.  Combining effects with the understanding of the 
operational environment is critical to successful planning.  This paper attempts to identify 
a model to fulfill the operational planning guidance contained.  
Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the 
progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. 
The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the 
commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to 
determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or 
achieving an objective. Commanders adjust operations based on their 
assessment to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is 
achieved.  (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006)  
 While the guidance for planning intelligence requirements and operational effects 
are contained within the publications, the formulation is up to the field commanders.  
Specific metrics to connect the intelligence requirements and operational effects are 
developed intuitively and often lack specific measures of performance or effectiveness 
that can be readily analyzed.   
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B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 Much of the research on piracy focuses on the tactical approach of interdiction 
and capture of pirates and their vessels.  This thesis is intended to address operational 
issues that face commanders when allocated few resources to patrol large regions.  
Problems of how to allocate the resources and equate operational objectives with 
intelligence collection are part of all military operations.  Without a common metric to 
determine operational effects and intelligence collection, it is impossible to adequately 
allocate the scarce resources.  This thesis explores one possible approach to identifying a 
common metric for the effects of operations and intelligence. 
C. RELATED LITERATURE 
1. Counter-Piracy Models 
The most comprehensive counter-piracy model is the model produced by the 
Naval Postgraduate School Systems Engineering Analysis Department for the Straits of 
Malacca in their 2005 report Maritime Domain Protection in the Straits of Malacca.  This 
model incorporates a five module simulation including sensors, command and control, 
force models, land inspections and sea inspections.  This model focused on reducing 
attacks while minimizing operational costs and impacts to regional commerce.  The 
model produced exhaustive reports on potential threats to regional shipping, cost benefit 
analysis of operational assets, and analysis of regional commerce. (Systems Engineering 
Analysis Cohort Seven, 2005) 
 Other counter-piracy models focus on the ability to identify and interdict pirates 
through maritime interdiction operations.  These models use queuing theory to maximize 
the number of ships that can be searched in a given region.  These models are often used 
when trying to clear a smaller region from known threats as in the case of studies to 
support Task Force 151 escort operations.  
2. Game Theory and Search Theory 
Because pirates and counter-piracy forces have opposing goals, it is natural to use 
game theory to analyze the piracy problem. One problem in the application of game 
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theory to military operations is the ability to accurately quantify a payout matrix in the 
face of uncertainty.  The basic problem of identifying units to associate with the payout 
matrix usually results in probabilities as in anti submarine warfare and ratio of forces in 
Melvin Dresher’s “Tactical Air War Game,” (Dresher, 1961). 
Payout matrices still have the problem of uncertainty.  Several solutions to 
problems with uncertainty have been produced over the years, but two stand out.  First 
the work of John Harsanyi in developing games with incomplete information identified 
the information available to each player as a type in a Bayesian Game (Myerson, 2004).  
This work also demonstrated examples of how to exploit an opponent’s erroneous beliefs 
and an explanation on complications resulting from the normal form of the game.   The 
work of Robert Aumann and Michael Maschler tackled the problem of repeated games 
with a lack of information and developed a solution methodology that influenced this 
model (Maschler, 1995). 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of this paper is intended to address the operational allocation problems 
faced by a small task force.  For this reason, several assumptions are required to focus the 
research on the desired problem.  The primary assumptions are in the capabilities of the 
platforms.  The platforms are given the ability to accurately observe several variables and 
determine a singular accurate value.  This does not account for several problems in 
reconnaissance that include false detections.  This model also assumes the Pirates are 
interested only in monetary reward.  Sources indicate this is true to a degree, but the 
complexity of criminal organizations and the regional tribal structure are not accounted 
for in the model.  The model assumes a single entity in control of piracy within the 
region.  This model is limited to scenarios where the interests of two parties are directly 
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II. THE MODEL 
This chapter discusses the modeling effort.  In Section A, we introduce the 
scenarios and motivations of our models.  In Section B, we define the mathematical 
models.  In Section C, we discuss the strategies that we want to study for both the Pirates 
and the Task Force. 
A. SCENARIOS 
 The scenarios model simple counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, 
where a small number of ships are assigned to patrol a large region against Pirates 
targeting commercial vessels for hijacking and ransom.  The region is divided into 
several small areas (an example with three areas is shown in Figure 1).  The Pirates 
operate in one area each day.  A Task Force, equipped with one Destroyer and one 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), is assigned to deter the Pirate’s operation and to 
protect the region.  The Task Force cannot see the Pirates, who blend into the local 
fishing fleet, but can prevent a Pirate’s attack in an area with the presence of a Destroyer.  
At the dawn of each day, the Pirates select an area to operate during the day, while the 
Task Force decides where to allocate the Destroyer and the UAV.  These daily operations 
are repeated each day for a season, while the Pirates attempt to earn as much as possible 
and the Task Force attempts to minimize the Pirates earnings.   
 
Figure 1.  Depiction of the region 
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 The Pirates’ expected reward is obtained from recent studies on the economics of 
pirates (McIntyre, 2009) and data from the International Maritime Bureau (ICC 
International Maritime Bureau, 2009).  The Pirates’ expected reward is estimated 
between $400,000 and $800,000 per day during peak seasons.  This range is based on the 
assumptions that the Pirates capture between six and eight ships per month and collect a 
ransom of between one and three million dollars per ship.  Operating costs, due to the 
cost of boats, weapons, and the care and feeding of the Pirates, is assumed to be 
negligible compared to the estimated profit.  The gangs of pirates are estimated to contain 
about 1,000 people.  The Pirate crews collect significantly more than the average Somali 
yearly income, which is about $600 per year.  Variations in ransom from the capture of a 
vessel includes uncertainties caused by the merchant vessels unwillingness to reveal 
actual ransom amounts, costs of negotiators, and delivery costs the pirates assume. 
 The Pirates focus operations in the area that gives them the highest rewards based 
on the number of commercial ships operating and the ease of capturing them in that area.  
Despite increased cooperation between commercial vessels and counter-piracy forces, 
merchant vessels still travel through warning areas, as evidenced by the number of ships 
attacked off of Somalia this year (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2009).  Figure 2 
shows the attack locations off the Somali coast between January and June of 2009.  
  
Figure 2. IMB depiction of pirate activity 
 
The reward the Pirates earn from operating in an area varies according to 
merchant vessel routing, sea states, and weather conditions, and is modeled by a normal 
distribution.  The mean of the reward distribution is between $400,000 and $800,000 
while the standard deviation is between $100,000 and $200,000.  The novelty of our 
model is that the Pirates, which consist of local gangs, have more information about these 
variations than the Task Force.  Consequently, the Pirates know precisely the distribution 
of rewards by operating in each area.  The Task Force, on the other hand, knows some 
areas are more profitable than the others, but the Task Force does not know precisely 
which area is the most (or least) profitable.  Specifically, we consider two scenarios as 
follows: In the first scenario, commercial vessels avoid the central regions by cutting 
corners transiting to Kenya or the Gulf of Aden as they pass through the outer areas.  The 
low density of commercial vessels in the central area results in a consistently low 
expected reward.  The outer areas have more vessel traffic and contain higher expected 
rewards.  Depending on the local conditions one outer area is easier for the Pirates to 
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operate, therefore more profitable than the other outer area.  The Pirates know which area 
is the most profitable one, but the Task Force does not. 
In the second scenario, the bulk of the merchant traffic travels through the central 
area with variations on the outer areas.  This situation is common during humanitarian 
relief efforts, when there is a high density traffic route to one of the neighboring ports.  In 
this situation, the expected reward in the central area contains the highest reward.  The 
variances occur on the fringe of the traffic route.  The local conditions make one of the 
outer areas more difficult to operate, hence less profitable than the other outer area. While 
the Pirates have complete information about each area’s value, the Task Force knows the 
center area is most profitable but does not know which outer area is least profitable.    
In both scenarios the Task Force can learn about the state of nature by operating 
in the outer areas, but not by operating in the center area.  The contrast between the two 
scenarios represents differences in operational allocation problems.  The first scenario 
represents a problem where the operational and intelligence collection requirements are 
aligned with each other.  In this scenario, the Task Force can gain most information by 
operating in the areas with the largest reward to the Pirates.  The second scenario 
represents a conflict between operations and intelligence.  In this case, preventing piracy 
in the most profitable areas does not provide any information about the actual state of 
nature.  
B. MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
 Suppose the whole region is divided into I small areas.  Each day, the Pirates 
select one area to operate in, while the Task Force selects one area to send its Destroyer.  
The planning horizon consists of T days in a season, during which the Pirates want to 
maximize the expected total reward, while the Task Force wants to minimize the total 
reward.  There are K possible states of nature. For state of nature k, the Pirates know the 
mean μi,k and the standard deviation σi,k  of the reward, if the Pirates operate in area i.  
The Pirates learn the actual state of nature k* at the beginning of each season, but the 
Task Force does not and has to initially assume that each state of nature is equally likely.  
The Task Force attempts to minimize the reward of the Pirates by choosing a mixed 
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strategy defined by the probabilities of operating in each area.  This Task Force game is 
produced by a weighted average of reward matrices in all states of nature. The result is 
referred to as the average game. 
 To assess the values of the Task Force’s assets, we consider four cases as follows: 
1. The Task Force has one Destroyer, which does not have any surveillance 
capability.  The Task Force assigns the Destroyer to operate in one area at the 
beginning of the day.   If the Pirates and the Destroyer occupy the same area, the 
Pirates will observe the Destroyer and not hijack any vessels that day and receive 
no reward.  If the Pirates and Destroyer choose different areas, the Pirates will 
hijack a vessel and receive the reward for the chosen area.  Because the Destroyer 
does not have any surveillance capability, the Task Force does not learn about the 
true state of nature and continues to play the average game introduced on the first 
day of the season. 
2. The Task Force has one Destroyer, which has surveillance capability.  The 
Destroyer conducts surveillance on the environment while protecting commercial 
vessels from the Pirates attack in one area.  The surveillance collected is 
transformed into a single number that represents the reward if the Pirates operate 
in that area without the presence of the Destroyer.  The Task Force daily 
allocation is made according to the mixed strategy corresponding to the average 
game, as in the previous case.  The only difference is that the Task Force can 
update the probability on the state of nature each day. 
3. The Task Force has one Destroyer and one UAV, both of which have surveillance 
capability.  The UAV has no ability to deter the Pirates, but can collect 
information on the area.  The allocation of the UAV is made after the Task Force 
determines the location of the Destroyer.  The UAV is sent to an area that the 
Destroyer does not occupy and provides information about the state of nature.  If 
the Destroyer goes to one outer area, the UAV goes to the other.  If the Destroyer 
goes to the central area, then the UAV is randomly assigned to one outer area with 
probability 0.5. 
 14
4. The Task Force learns the state of nature before the season begins.  The mixed 
strategy employed by the Task Force is the optimal mixed strategy to minimize 
the Pirates’ reward in the matrix representing the true state of nature.  This case is 
used as a benchmark to assess the value of the Task Force’s surveillance 
capability. 
The Pirates’ operations are hidden within the local fishing fleets and are not 
visible to the Task Force.  After a hijack, the Task Force knows of the incident but does 
not learn the reward or area of the hijacking.  The only information the Task Force can 
gain about the state of nature is the information about the region they operate in on a 
specific day.  The Pirates know about the Task Force’s lack of information and apply a 
pure strategy that maximizes their reward against the Task Force mixed strategy.   
The Task Force attempt to minimize the reward includes efforts to learn the actual 
state of nature.  This creates a common problem between deploying assets to perform an 
operational mission vice a reconnaissance mission.  The reconnaissance mission can learn 
about the state of nature and improve the mixed strategy the Task Force uses, but if the 
Task Force only has one Destroyer, then the reconnaissance mission reduces the 
immediate operational effect.  The Task Force can overcome this through the allocation 
of a separate reconnaissance platform such as a UAV to operate independently of the 
Destroyer and learn the true state of nature.  In each scenario, the two states of nature are 
symmetric so that the value of each state played as a game with a mixed strategy will 
have equal values. 
C. STRATEGIES 
1. Task Force Strategy 
The Task Force strategy is considered a myopic strategy because it uses 
information available on day t to minimize the Pirates’ reward on  day t+1 without taking 
into account how the learning on day t+1 might affect the future reward.  With the 
myopic strategy, the Task Force first computes the average game between two possible 
states using the updated state probabilities. The Task Force then computes the optimal 
mixed strategy in this average game. This produces the myopic value, which is also equal 
to the value of the game, if no further information is collected.   The process of collecting 
information about the environment determines the Task Force’s perception about the true 
state of nature.  The Task Force’s perception is represented by the probability ( )kp t  a 
given state k is the true state of nature at a given day t.  The Task Force’s perception is 
updated after collecting information about an area.  
The update of ( )kp t  is conducted through observation each day operations are 
conducted in an area.  Consider the case when the Task Force has one Destroyer.  The 
initial belief of the Task Force is that each state of nature is equally likely.  After the 
Destroyer occupies an area j for one day, it observes the local conditions for that day and 
observes the reward rj(t). The observed reward varies day-to-day according to the 
distribution representing the expected reward in the area.  The Task Force can then 
compute an updated probability that the state of nature is each of the K possible states.  
We assume the reward follows a normal distribution, with the following density function 
where μ is the mean and σ the standard deviation. 
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The process of collecting information is modeled using a Bayesian update.  In 
Case 1, no information is gained from the Destroyer and the values of ( )kp t remain 
constant for all t.  In Case 2 (the Destroyer collects information on the area) and Case 3  
(the Destroyer and UAV collect information), the Task Force learns about an area in the 
form of the observed reward  in area j for time t to update ( )jr t ( )kp t .  If the Task Force 
has complete information, as in Case 4, no update is required as the value of ( )kp t is equal 
to one when k is equal to k* and equal to zero otherwise. The information gained about 
one area is then used to update the Task Force beliefs about the state of nature using 
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 The Task Force then computes the next day’s average game, and uses it to 
determine a new mixed strategy.  
The Task Force strategy is a vector of probabilities over the possible 
operating areas for a given day t. The strategy is chosen to minimize the reward, or game 
value  in state k at stage t.  This game value uses the weighted average reward 
( )iy t
( )kv t
( )i t of the average game computed by the weighted average of the corresponding state’s 
matrix ,i k , with the weight equal to the Task Force perception of a state of nature ( )kp t .  
The computation to determine the reward the Task Force expects begins with the 
following linear program to solve the value of the average game.   
FORMULATION (G1) : 
min ( )
y
v t       (G1.1) 
Such that (1 ( )) ( ) ( ) 0i iy t t v t      i   (G1.2) 











 i (t)  i,k pk (t)
k1
K      (G1.4)
 
 
Since,   i (t)  0
 
for some i, then yi(t)=0.  In other words, if the Pirates cannot 
collect any reward in area i, then the Task Force does not need to send the Destroyer to 
area i.  If    i (t)  0  then in the optimal solution the constraint in Equation (G1.2) is tight.  
In other words, the equality holds in Equation (G1.2), which yields 
( )( ) 1
( )i i
v ty t




This provides an analytical method to determine optimal employment, if the value 
of the game is known.  While the value of the game is unknown at this point, we know 
that ( )iy t is a probability, and the sum of ( )iy t  over the set i is equal to one.  This implies 
that 
1





t        (G1.7) 
 Summing over the set of possible strategies I this can be simplified into 







t        (G1.8) 
This leads to an analytical result for the value of the average game in terms of the 











     (G1.9)
 
 While the Task Force’s strategy for the next day is computed using equation 
(G1.6) and (G1.9), an update is conducted to compute ( )kp t  and identify the actual state 
of nature.   
 Originally, we described the learning process with only the Destroyer.  Next, we 
consider the case when the Task Force also has a UAV and can use it to gain information 
about the state of nature.  The UAV, once assigned to an area on a given day, observes 
the reward value in that area for the day, but does not deter the Pirates’ attack.  The 
difference between the two states of nature is based on the difference between the two 
outer areas in each scenario.  The updated information on the reward value for outside 
regions is helpful in learning the true state of nature.  Therefore, if the Destroyer goes to 
an outside area, it is optimal to assign the UAV to the other outside area.  If the Destroyer 
goes to the central area, then we assign the UAV to each outside area with probability 
0.5. 
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2. Pirate Strategy 
 The Pirates are familiar with the region.  In order to assess the value of each Task 
Force asset, we consider a worst-case scenario by assuming that the Pirates are able to 
observe the action taken by the Task Force on a daily basis.  Therefore, the Pirates know 
what the Task Force learned about the area and apply the same Bayes formula to predict 
Task Force’s mixed strategy on the next day.  Consequently, the Pirates can apply the 
best pure strategy against Task Force’s mixed strategy each day.  The familiarity of the 
region allows the Pirates to fully capitalize on the lack of information on the side of the 
Task Force.  The resulting reward computed in G2 is greater than what the Task Force 
expects, and can be viewed as a worst-case scenario from Task Force’s standpoint.   
 The expected reward the Pirates can receive ( )r t is computed using a pure 
strategy against the Task Force mixed strategy yj(t).  The reward is computed for a given 
day t by: 
FORMULATION (G2) :  
    *,( ) max (1 ( ))ii ki Ir t y t 
  (G2)
 
  The Pirates update the Task Force perception of the states of nature and computed 
the reward value and pure strategy every day prior to sending out their boats.  The pure 
strategy is the optimal strategy the Pirates can employ knowing the true state of nature, 
while the Task Force uses the myopic strategy based on the average game.  The Pirates 
only change their behavior based on the perceptions of the Task Force.  The Pirates do 
not change their behavior based on the allocation of the UAV.  
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III. NUMERICAL DEMONSTRATIONS AND ANALYSES 
 We implemented the model in a simulation using Microsoft Excel with Visual 
Basic for Applications.  In each scenario, we consider four cases that represent different 
Task Force capabilities.   The scenarios are different in the estimated rewards the Pirates 
receive by operating in each area.  The mean value of the rewards can be $400K, $600K, 
and $800K, but the primary difference is the location of the known and unknown values.  
For each scenario, we vary the standard deviation of reward among $100K, $150K, or 
$200K.   
Table 1.   Sample pirate reward matrix. 
 
Task Force Strategies 
State k= 1 
Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 
Area 
1 




















 From Table 1 the reward matrices for each scenario represent one of the two 
states of nature.  In Scenario 1, the values for μ1,1, μ2,1, and μ3,1 are $600K, $400K, and 
$800K, respectively and the values for μ1,2, μ2,2, and μ3,2 are $800K, $400K, and 
$600K, respectively.  Scenario 2 sets the values of μ1,1, μ2,1, and μ3,1 at $600K, $800K, 
and $400K and μ1,2, μ2,2, and μ3,2 at $400K, $800K, and $600K.   
 The simulations ran 1000 times for each level of standard deviation.  Without loss 
of generality, we set the true state to be state one, because of the symmetry between two 
states.   We consider two measures of effectiveness: (1) the cumulative reward the Pirates 
receive over the season and (2) the number of days required for the Task Force to learn 
the probability state one is the true state of nature is greater than 90%. 
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A. REWARD FOR THE PIRATES 
We compute the cumulative reward by summing over the Pirates’ expected daily 
reward for the duration of the season.  The Pirates maximize this value by choosing the 
best pure strategy against the Task Force’s myopic strategy on each day.   
To derive the values of different assets of the Task Force, we consider the four 
cases discussed in Chapter II.  In Case 1, the Task Force sends the Destroyer into the 
region, without collecting any information, but prevents the Pirates from operating freely.  
Case 1 represents the operational effect of the Destroyer. Case 2, which allows the 
Destroyer to collect information, represents the combined operational and reconnaissance 
effect of the Destroyer.  Case 3 represents the effect of the additional reconnaissance 
provided by a UAV.  Case 4, when the Task Force has full information about the true 
state of nature represents the operational effect with full information.  The following 
graphs depict the daily expected reward of the Pirates. The top and bottom lines represent 
Case 1 and Case 4.  These lines form the upper and lower bounds of the Pirates’ daily 
reward.  The areas under the curves represent the cumulative reward values.  The areas 
between the curves represent the benefit of additional capabilities to the Task Force.  The 
areas between Case 1 and Case 2 represent the Pirates’ reduced reward due to the 
surveillance capability by the Destroyer.  The areas between Case 2 and Case 3 represent 
the reduced reward due to additional information gained by the UAV. The areas between 
Case 3 and Case 4 represent potential reduction in Pirates’ reward if the Task Force has 


































































































Figure 3. Expected daily reward for the Pirates through the season for Scenario 1.  
Maximum standard error in cases 2 and 3 after 1000 simulations is less than $1,000 































































































Figure 4. Expected daily reward for the Pirates through the season for Scenario 2.  
Maximum standard error in cases 2 and 3 after 1000 simulations is less than $2,000 
throughout the 30 day season. 
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The values from the graphs in Figure 3 and Figure 4 are summarized in the following 
table. 
 
Table 2.   The value added by Task Force’s assets from Figure 3 and 4.   
Scenario Sigma Case 1              
DDG w/o ISR
Case 2              
DDG w/ISR no UAV
Case 3              
DDG w/ ISR and UAV
Case 4              
Full Information
100 11200 1614 36 73
150 11200 1490 120 114
200 11200 1282 272 168
100 10286 2269 203 165
150 10286 2038 379 221
200 10286 1678 627 332
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Reduction in Pirate Cumulative Reward                                                      
(in thousands of dollars)
 
Table 2 shows the greatest decrease in Pirates’ expected reward is due to the 
deterrence capability of the Destroyer.  Decreasing marginal utility is evident for the 
information gained by the Destroyer as σ decreases where the Destroyer can learn about 
the true state of nature more quickly.  While the marginal utility of the information from 
the UAV increases with an increase in σ.   
Note that each scenario has a different cumulative reward for Case 1 despite using 
the same range of reward values.   The resultant values may even counter the Task 
Force’s operational intuition.  In Scenario 1, where the Task Force does not know which 
area is most valuable to the Pirates, is the Task Force must spread their one asset across 
the possible areas to gain the maximum effect.  In Scenario 2, the Task Force does know 
the most valuable area and affects a significant result with a strategy that concentrates on 
the most valuable area.  It could be easy to believe that the uninformed mixed strategy 
against Scenario 2 would be more effective that the uninformed mixed strategy against 
Scenario 1.  The graphs show the difference in expected reward is actually larger in 
Scenario 2.  This is due to the Pirates taking advantage of the lack of information held by 
the Task Force.  The result is demonstrated by computing the value of the average game 
for each scenario.   
The values for the reward associated with each area are described Chapter II 
Section A and derived from data from the International Maritime Bureau.  In Scenario 1, 
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if the Destroyer does not have any surveillance capability, then the Task Force plays the 
average game with the following payout matrix. 
    
0 600 600 0 800 800 0 700 700
.5 400 0 400 .5 400 0 400 400 0 400
800 800 0 600 600 0 700 700 0
                          
The value of this average game is 373. 
The payout matrix for the average game in Scenario 2 follows and has a value of 380. 
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
   
 
0 600 600 0 400 400 0 500 500
.5 800 0 800 .5 800 0 800 800 0 800
400 400 0 600 600 0 500 500 0
                     
It is easy to see that in Scenario 2, there is an increase in the value of the game 
over Scenario 1 despite using the same numbers.   The difference is further exacerbated 
when the Pirates are allowed to capitalize on the lack of information with a pure strategy 
as is evidenced by the line representing Case 1 from graphs in Figures 3 and 4.   
Table 2 shows the largest decrease in cumulative reward is due to deterrence 
provided by the presence of the Destroyer.   The decrease is constant with respect to σ but 
does vary with the scenario.   As discussed earlier the two scenarios should have different 
cumulative reward values based on the location of the highest reward area.  This is 
evident by comparing the difference between the curves representing no information 
gained and complete information on the side of the Task Force. Figures 3 and 4 show the 
Pirates’ daily reward decays toward the same value in each scenario.   Differences in the 
cumulative values in Table 2 are caused by a slower learning process in scenario one.  
The learning process will be discussed in the following section. 
B. LEARNING FOR THE TASK FORCE 
The learning process of the Task Force is defined as the ability of the Task Force 
to learn the true state of nature.  The measure of effectiveness is the number of days 
required for the Task Force to learn the probability state one is the true state of nature is 
greater than 90%.   In each scenario, the Task Force was able to reliably achieve this goal 
within the thirty-day season.  Still, the longer the true state of nature was ambiguous the 
more reward the Pirates accumulated.   
The previous section detailed a slower learning process derived from observations 
on cumulative Pirate reward.  One reason for the slower learning process is as follows.  
Given the average game for Scenario 2 is represented by the following matrix: 
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
   
0 600 600 0 400 400 0 500 500
.5 800 0 800 .5 800 0 800 800 0 800
400 400 0 600 600 0 500 500 0
                     
It is evident that the Task Force would want to initially use a strategy that focuses on area 
two to minimize the reward of the Pirates.  This slows the learning process because the 
Destroyer spends most of the time in the area that does not help identify the state of 
nature.  This logic captures the dilemma of allocating assets to maximize operational 
effects vice maximizing intelligence collection. 
The graphs in Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate the Task Force learning process in the 
scenarios as a measure of probability the state of nature is state one versus the number of 
days of operations.  Table 3 represents a summation of the data in Figures 5 and 6.  
 
Table 3.   Days required to obtain knowledge of the actual state of nature.  
   
Scenario Sigma Case 2            
No UAV










Days Required Before Probability State of 
Nature is State 1 is Greater Than 90%
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 The variation of results by σ is expected due to the difficulty in gathering 
information with increased uncertainty.  The differences between the scenarios contain 
additional differences.  The differences may be more visible through the graph depicting 




























































































Figure 5. Task Force perception the probability the state of nature is the true state in 
Scenario 1.  Maximum standard error in cases 2 and 3 after 1000 simulations is less than 
































































































Figure 6. Task Force perception the probability the state of nature is the true state of 
nature in Scenario 2.  Maximum standard error in cases 2 and 3 after 1000 simulations is 
less than .008 over the 30 day season. 
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The different rates of learning are evident in the graphs by noting the difference in 
area under the curve for scenario two with and without the UAV (Case 2 and Case 3 
respectively).  The difference in learning rate is further exaggerated when there is greater 
uncertainty in the individual area represented by σ. 
The primary factors affecting the learning process were the assets allocated, the 
standard deviation of the area, and the scenario.  While the number of assets and standard 
deviation are expected to impact the Task Force ability to learn, the effect of the scenario 
requires further analysis.  The Task Force myopic strategy focuses on the area they 
believe is most valuable.  In Scenario 1, this is not as significant because the area with the 
highest reward according to the average game is an area that contains information about 
the true state of nature.  The result is that efforts to maximize the operational effect will 
also maximize the rate the Task Force learns the true state of nature.   
Scenario 2 highlights a dilemma in tasking operational and intelligence platforms.  
The most effective Task Force mixed strategy for the average game focuses on Area 2 
because it provides the least reward to the Pirates.  Unfortunately, the Task Force cannot 
learn about the true state of nature by operating in Area 2, since it is the same in both 
states of nature.  The differences are most pronounced in Case 2 when there is no UAV to 
focus on intelligence collection.  Figure 7 demonstrates how this effect is made more 
























Figure 7. Days required for the Task Force to determine the probability the true state 
of nature is greater than 90% for a given scenario and case. 
 
The differences can also be seen in the curves of Case 2 in Figures 5 and 6.  The numbers 
in Table 3 confirm this as well.   
C. DISCUSSION 
Two observations may help improve allocation of operational assets.  The first 
involves an understanding of the tactical employment of an operational asset through a 
game theoretic perspective.  The second accounts for the value of information in a 
scenario.   
The first observation about the employment of the Destroyer in Scenario 2 
concerns the allocation to a non-informative area.  The most obvious method to avoid this 
problem is to focus initial allocation to areas that provide information about the state of 
nature.  The addition of the UAV solves this problem because it always operates in an 





reverting to a purely myopic strategy.  For example, in Scenario 2, without a UAV 
available, a commander may choose to focus on intelligence collection for 12 days prior 
to maximizing operational effects. 
The second observation is that the use of collecting information reaches a point of 
diminishing returns.  The utility of the UAV decreases over time and is apparent with the 
converging values of Case 2 and Case 3 in Figures 4 through 7.  If the Task Force 
objective is to change behavior patterns by decreasing the Pirate’s cumulative reward, 
continuous reconnaissance may not be required.  However, this model does not account 
for search factors that further degrade the ability to collect information.  This will be 
discussed further in recommendations.  
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. MATHEMATICAL LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS  
The limits of the model are divided into two aspects. First, the assumptions of the 
game theoretic construct using the assumptions based on behavioral aspects will be 
examined.  Second, the limitations of the model will be analyzed for computational 
efficiency.   
The two-person, zero-sum game theoretic construct requires the model be limited 
to two players with diametrically opposed rewards.  One player is assumed to have 
complete information and the other player with some predisposed belief.  This 
assumption allows the model to function as a two-person zero-sum game with a lack of 
information on one side.   One additional assumption is complete information is available 
to one side, which is not always the case.  The uncertainty in the information available to 
the Pirates was modeled by using a normal distribution to represent the reward value for 
the Pirates.  The result permitted the Pirates to act as if they had perfect information. 
The ability to expand the model in terms of areas within the region, strategies of 
the players, and possible states of nature can be accomplished with some cost in the 
amount of computation required.  The formulations are called once per turn of the 
simulation.  One additional consideration is the time required to run individual 
simulations and the duration of the season.     
B. FUTURE STUDIES  
The model has the potential to be expanded for future use by using more complex 
game theoretic constructs, incorporating actual sensor data, or incorporating more 
detailed models of the reward functions.   The advantage of each is to increase the 
accuracy and detail of the model.  Some expansions of the model also have the potential 
to model different aspects of conflict including information warfare, coalition building, 
and intelligence analysis. 
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Nonzero-sum games, vice the current zero-sum game, have the potential to model 
more complex scenarios where the interests of the players are not diametrically opposed.  
The nonzero-sum game would allow a more diverse scenario and application into 
operations that are not specifically designed to counter a specific enemy action.   
Since most counter-piracy operations are coalition efforts, there is a benefit to 
incorporate n-person games to understand the dynamics and potential rewards to be 
gained through a coalition.   More than two players in a game create significant 
complications, but can yield information relating to the effectiveness added by individual 
coalition members.  This would benefit coalition building efforts by helping to determine 
command structures and incentives offered by coalition leaders. Guillermo Owen, in his 
book Game Theory discusses several examples of coalition games that could incorporate 
a lack of information into the reward structure (Owen, 1995). 
The model developed in this thesis could also be applied in the context of 
information warfare.  Specifically, instead of the Task Force using a learning process to 
gain information about the state of nature, the Pirates could send disinformation to deny 
the Task Force access to the actual state of information. This could also include a lack of 
information on each side, where both sides participate in a learning or disinformation 
process.  The process would require additional simulations, and the Pirates would have to 
adopt the myopic strategy as well.   
Incorporating actual sensor data from platforms would offer the opportunity to 
study the effects of false indications, imperfect probability of detection, and actual sensor 
coverage area.  One example where this could be useful is to address a common 
operational dilemma of tasking reconnaissance assets.  Reconnaissance assets are often 
assigned in two ways, direct support or associated support.  Direct support assigns the 
reconnaissance asset to work directly for the operational asset.  Associated support 
assigns the reconnaissance asset to work separately from the operational asset.  This 
model specifically addressed associated support.  Some benefits of the direct support are 
greater area of operational effect, increased accuracy of collection due to sensor fusion, 
and improved communications between the assets.  The advantage of associated support, 
as in this model, is that operational effects can be maximized without the constraint of 
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intelligence collection requirements and vice versa.  A possible mechanism to address 
this would be two models each using a different allocation method.  The direct support 
model allows the operational asset to cover a larger space decreasing the number of 
possible strategies.  This model is similar to Case 2.  The associated support model 
allows the assets to cover multiple areas, but the areas are smaller resulting in a greater 
number of possible strategies.   
The assumption that the information collected in a given area is readily translated 
into a specific reward value from a distribution is very different from the reality of 
intelligence collection.   Intelligence is typically tasked to the reconnaissance asset 
through a list of requirements that the reconnaissance asset can observe, such as number 
of ships in an area.  The observables that form the essential elements of information are 
difficult to translate into a specific value.  Regression analysis may be a mechanism to 
translate several variables, such as merchant traffic density, sea state, and weather into a 
specific reward value.  This would provide the opportunity to study the effectiveness of 
different capabilities against specific elements of information.   
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